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FOREWORD: DISABLING BROWN
Michael Ashley Stein*
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Brown
v. Board of Education,' arguably the most famous American civil rights case of the
twentieth century,2 striking down segregation in public schools. Exactly fifty years
later, the Court decided Tennessee v. Lane,3 finding that disabled citizens may sue
states under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) to enforce
a right of access to court services.4
Though ostensibly a victory for people with disabilities,5 the majority decision
in Lane is the by-product of a fractured Court,6 and is limited both in scope and ap-
plicability. Despite the ADA's prohibition against disabled persons being "excluded
from participation in or be[ing] denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity,"7 the Court confined its holding to an individual's right
* Professor, William & Mary School of Law; Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School.
I thank Carlos Ball, Mary Anne Case, Angela Harris, Sonia Katyal, Jane Larson, and Michael
Waterstone for their comments; Michael Lockaby for his research; IBRL Director Neal
Devins for his support; IBRL Coordinator Melody Nichols for her kindness; and Mary Anne
Case and Jane Larson for facilitating the in-person discussion that contributed to the sym-
posium's success. Holland M. Tahvonen contributed valuable research and drafting assistance.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Brown has been described as "the most famous decision in the history of the United
States Supreme Court." Michael J. Klarman, Brown at 50, 90 VA. L. REv. 1613, 1613
(2004); see also Martha Minow, Education for Co-Existence, 44 ARiZ. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002)
("The condemnation of racially separate education as inherently unequal in Brown v. Board
of Education stands as the most famous decision of the United States Supreme Court, as a
decision that has inspired other constitutional democracies to build courts empowered to in-
terpret principles of equality." (footnote omitted)).
3 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
I d. at 533-34 ("[W]e conclude that Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating
the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress's § 5
authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
' See, e.g., Harriet McBryde Johnson, Stairway to Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 11 (calling Lane a "civil rights victory," but noting that "[p]eople with dis-
abilities count it as a victory when rights simply aren't rolled back as far as they might have
been.").
6 The Court split 5-4 in favor of Lane. In addition to the majority opinion penned by
Justice Stevens, there were two separate concurrences (Justices Souter and Ginsburg) and
three separate dissents (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas). Lane, 541
U.S. at 512.
7 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2004).
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of access to courts.8 In so doing, it left open the question of whether people with
disabilities can gain relief when denied access to other state facilities, programs, and
services.9 Lane is, therefore, of a piece consistent with the Court's positive ADA
jurisprudence upholding claims within a narrow set of plaintiff-specific rights ° - in
this instance, the right of a paraplegic wheelchair-user to be able to physically enter
a court of law to attend and answer criminal charges rather than drag himself up and
down flights of stairs, as he had done for his first appearance." From a disability
8 Lane, 541 U.S. at 533-34.
9 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court applied its holding in Lane to the prison con-
text, reversing the dismissal of a paraplegic prisoner's ADA claims on grounds of sovereign
immunity. United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). The Court reaffirmed its con-
clusion that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity to the extent the state actors' conduct actually
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, but remanded the case so the lower courts could determine
(i) which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent
such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such
misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment whether
Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct
is nevertheless valid.
Id. at 882. In so doing, the Court side-stepped many key issues. Whether Lane will be applied
in other contexts has not been answered. Our reading of Lane is that the Court would likely
hold publicly accessible voting to be a state-provided service whose centrality rises to the
level of protection. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-23 (noting that Title II seeks to protect "a
variety of... constitutional guarantees"). However, given the silence of the opinion on point,
the unresolved arguments over what kind of access is reasonable, and the changing roster of
Justices, this result cannot be taken for granted. If, for example, the Court found that making
polling places accessible to disabled citizens was sufficiently costly, it might find such ex-
penses disproportionate (in light of proposed alternative facilities or means) to the right
claimed. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (holding that § 5
legislation is only valid if the remedy is proportional to the alleged injury). For an assess-
ment, see Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV.
793 (2005).
10 See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (concluding that a professional
golfer with one wholly functional leg must be allowed to ride in a golf cart between holes).
Thus, Dean Soifer's assertion that the Court selectively grants certiorari to outlier cases as
a means of ridiculing the ADA while also narrowly upholding its tenets seems increasingly
plausible. See Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, BetterAngels, and Unprincipled
Neutrality Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1285, 1290 (2003) (noting that the Supreme
Court's ADA decisions seem to suggest "a stealth strategy on the part of the swing voters on
the Court" and explaining that "[t]he swing Justices will accept narrow instances of ADA
coverage that are likely to grab public attention and are easily restricted to their unusual
facts."). At the same time, one must note the ruling in Olmstead v. L. C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999),
in which the Court held that people with mental disabilities must be allowed to live in
circumstances invoking the least possibly restricted environments. Id. at 600-01.
" Lane, 541 U.S. at 513-14. The second plaintiff, a paraplegic wheelchair-using court
reporter, id. at 514, effectively disappears from the decision, see id. at 523 (discussing
criminal defendants' rights), much as the regrettably named smoke-sensitive prison guard in
Garrett, Milton Ash, see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 362 (2001),
receded from the Court's opinion. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356.
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rights perspective, Lane is nevertheless preferable to the broad policy statements the
Court issues when negatively interpreting the ADA's employment provisions.'
2
What, then, can be learned by examining the respective methodologies and con-
texts of Brown and Lane? On one level, an argument can be made that applying the
methodology of Brown to Lane once more yields Brown. In other words, despite
the Court reserving judgment until unanimity (and the moral salience it was thought
to bear) could be attained,13 the Brown decision itself was severely circumscribed
in its reach. 4 Notably, and infamously, the second Brown opinion restrained the
implementation of public school integration to a pace of "all deliberate speed."' 5
More than fifty years later, public schools and public universities continue to struggle
with de facto segregation. 6 Lane, too, is a minimalist opinion. Although the Justices
ruled that court services are subject to Title HI of the ADA, it did so in an insipid
12 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (explaining that a
disabled person whose disability threatens his health can be excluded from workplace
opportunity); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (finding that collective
bargaining agreements, even those excluding disabled employees, are per se valid); Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (determining that a person must be
substantially limited from a range of jobs to be considered disabled, not just limited in the
one for which she has applied); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (stating
that employers may defer to federal regulations that negate employees' qualifications even
when those regulations are functionally inaccurate and may be waived); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (concluding that ADA plaintiffs' disabilities must be
measured in their mitigated states); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
(holding that, for an employee to be regarded as disabled under the ADA, an employer must
have subjectively so considered the putative employee); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp.,
526 U.S. 795 (1999) (deciding that persons who receive SSDI payments following a sworn
statement that they are unable to work are under a burden of explaining why they nevertheless
have been discriminated against under the ADA's employment provisions). See generally
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Anti-
discrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004) (describing how the Court views disability
rights as being different from other civil rights, hence not worthy of equal legal protection).
13 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIvIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALIrY (2004).
"' For discussions of Brown's impact (or lack thereof), see, for example, the Virginia Law
Review's Special Issue on Twentieth Century Constitutional History, including David J.
Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education,
80 VA. L. REV. 151 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown Is Dead! Long Live Brown!:
The Endless Attempt to Canonize a Case, 80 VA. L. REV. 161 (1994); and Mark Tushnet, The
Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173 (1994).
'5 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992); see also Fighting School
Resegregation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A24 (describing a study by the Harvard Civil
Rights Project regarding segregration in public schools). Courts continue to consider whether
elimination of de facto segregation constitutes a compelling government interest when reviewing
school districts' policies. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1,426
F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 14-16
(1st Cir. 2005).
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opinion. The five-person majority did not define what it meant by the term "court
services."' 17 Additionally, in garnering a majority, Justice Souter' s reference to state
and Supreme Court complicity in disability discrimination in the form of eugenics
was relegated to a separate concurrence.'8 Moreover, four Justices strongly dissented
from Lane.'9 The implications of Lane thus far are difficult to evaluate; accordingly,
the argument can be made that Lane is a modem day avatar of Brown.2"
Such a reading of Lane, however plausible, neglects the historical significance
of these opinions. Brown was issued without the benefit of a civil rights statute
2
'
and against a dominant dejure system of segregation.22 The Court's defiance of the
'" For example, did the Court limit itself to access for the physically disabled to court-
rooms (and if so, as defendants and/or as court reporters?), or does the ruling also extend to
sign language interpretation, Braille transcription, and infra-red hearing loops for parties,
witnesses, and attorneys? See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (holding that
"Title II unquestionably is valid § 5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating
the accessibility of judicial services," but failing to identify the scope of such services).
I8 d. at 534-35 (Souter, J., concurring).
I note that if the Court engaged in a more expansive enquiry ... ,the evidence
to be considered would underscore the appropriateness of action under § 5 to ad-
dress the situation of disabled individuals before the courts, for that evidence
would show that the judiciary itself has endorsed the basis for some of the very
discrimination subject to congressional remedy under § 5.
Id. at 534.
'9 Id. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas); id.
at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 565 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
20 Overall, the appellate courts' application of Lane has been somewhat of a mixed bag.
Compare Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474 (4th Cir.
2005) (permitting a law student with intractable migraines to sue a state-funded law school
for monetary damages under Title II for failing to accommodate her disability), Ass'n for
Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 405 F.3d 954 (11 th Cir. 2005) (upholding disabled
students right to sue a public university under Title H where the school failed to provide aids
and services), and Badillo-Santiago v. Naveira-Merly, 378 F.3d 1, 5-6 (lst Cir. 2004) (finding
that the plaintiff's claim based on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's failure to accommo-
date his hearing impairment in court was cognizable), with Douris v. Office of Pa. Attorney
Gen., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17269, at *5 (3d Cir. Aug. 16,2005) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred a wheelchair user's right to the sue state where the claim involved lack
of access to confiscated property auction, not court services), and Bill M. v. Neb. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs. Fin. & Support, 408 F.3d 1096, 1100 n.3 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing
Lane as a "carefully cabined" opinion and declining to extend the holding to the plaintiff's claim
for denial of medical services).
21 It preceded the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6, by a decade.
22 In 1954, seventeen states and the District of Columbia mandated segregation in public
schools. Those states included Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Brian Willoughby, Brown v. Board: The United
States, Circa 1954, Tolerance.org, http://www.tolerance.org/teach/magazine/features.j sp?=0&
is=34&ar--488 (last visited Jan. 29,2006). Four other states - Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico,
and Wyoming - permitted segregation, though they did not mandate it. See id.
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23hate-filled and historic edifice of racism, however mildly proffered, was courageous.
By contrast, the ADA was passed by a nearly unanimous Congress, and heralded
as an "emancipation proclamation" for people with disabilities.24 During hearings
on the ADA, Congress was presented with a catalog of evidence on the historical
exclusion of the disabled from American society.2 As a result of those hearings,
Congress was persuaded that the overall status of Americans with disabilities was
a dismal one, concluding that they have historically been "relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society,"26 and "continually encounter various forms
of discrimination."27 Ruling that persons with disabilities may assert a right to
access court services - the provision of which is explicitly enumerated in the accom-
panying Code of Federal Regulations 28 - was hardly an act of bravery. In both
Brown and Lane, the respective Courts did the least that they could to protect the
civil rights of a marginalized group of individuals. The Court's action in Brown, how-
ever, challenged centuries of deeply instantiated animus against African Americans
without legislative support.29 By contrast, the Lane decision declined full utilization
of clear congressional backing for rectifying invidious, if "unintentional," exclusion
of disabled persons frm the public sphere.30 Consequently, however much more we
might wish from Brown, that Court is worthy of praise; the scant holding of the
Lane Court, while certainly preferable to a negative ruling, is far from satisfactory.
23 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Why the Courts, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 133, 143 (2000)
(describing the "boldness" of the Brown decision and using Brown as an example of the
"radiating effects a judicial decision can have"); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Confirmation of
Supreme Court Justices in the Modem Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 577-78 (1988) (calling
Brown "the Court's courageous step in overturning over a half century of error").
24 Two legislators are credited with this description. See 136 CONG. REC. S9689 (daily
ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Senator Harkin); 135 CONG. REC. S10789 (daily ed. Sept.
7, 1989) (statement of Senator Kennedy). For a detailed account of the politics underlying
the ADA's passage, see JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DIsABILITIES FORGING
A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 105-41 (1993).
25 Congress summarized its conclusions as to this evidence in the ADA's Findings
section. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000); see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMO-
DATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDuAL ABILrrIEs 159 (1983) ("Historically, society has ten-
ded to isolate and segregate handicapped people. Despite some improvements .... discrimi-
nation against handicapped persons continues to be a serious and pervasive social problem.").
26 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).
27 Id. § 12101(a)(5).
28 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149-151 (2005).
29 See, e.g., Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term: Foreword, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 96 (1954).
30 Although some commentators have described the physical exclusion of disabled
persons as "apartheid by design," ROBERT IMRIE, PROPERTY DYNAMICS AND THE MULTIPLE
DESIGN NEEDS OF DISABLED PEOPLE (1999), most concur with Harlan Hahn's view that
"discrimination on the basis of disability... usually is marked by subtle forms of inequality
rather than by blatant prejudice or bigotry." Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability,
Sexuality and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 97, 108
(1994). Neither is conducive to equality.
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Applying the methodology of Brown to Lane yields a decision more in line with pre-
Brown decisions, ordering segregation to the extent that state facilities were not
"equal."'
Consider, however, the implications of applying Lane's methodology to Brown.
The majority decision, upholding the given civil right to the least extent possible,
might turn out much the same. So, too, the concurring decision enumerating aspects
of state- and Court-condoned racism. 32 The dissents, however, would disable Brown
by balking at the notion that integrating the school system was an appropriate exercise
of congressional power. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who as a law clerk urged Justice
Jackson to uphold Plessy' s separate-but-equal doctrine in Brown,33 would first point
out the absence of empirical evidence demonstrating inferiority in segregated facilities.
The seven sociological and psychological studies cited in Brown's famous Footnote
1131 would simply be insufficient to support the broad holding that separate is in-
herently unequal. Moreover, the Chief Justice would have required a more exacting
inquiry to determine what constitutes "unequal. 35 In Lane, Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested that so long as a disabled person was not "actually denied... access," the man-
ner of access, however demeaning, is irrelevant for constitutional purposes.36 Likewise,
31 See, e.g., Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (citing
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)) (granting a writ of mandamus and
holding that the petitioner was entitled to receive professional education); Gaines, 305 U.S.
337 (ordering a white law school to admit black students where there was no separate, but
equal facility within the state of Missouri); see also Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md.
1936) (ordering a state law school to admit black students because there was no separate
school for African Americans).
32 Imagine, if you will, Justice Souter proclaiming the Court's complicity in condoning
racism by denying rights of citizenship to former slaves, who were, as Justice Taney noted
in his infamous Dred Scott opinion, considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings
at the time the Constitution was adopted. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
404-05 (1856).
33 See William H. Rehnquist, A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases, reprinted in
117 Cong. Rec. 45,313, 45,440-41 (1971) (arguing that Plessy "was right and should be
re-affirmed"). Rehnquist claimed that the memo was more reflective of Justice Jackson's
views than his own. Id. at 45,440.
4 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.ll (1954).
3 Cf. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (holding that the
Family and Medical Leave Act was a "'congruent and proportional"' response to gender
discrimination by the states (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
374 (2001))). In Hibbs, the Chief Justice (surprisingly) took a more liberal approach to the
congressional findings underlying the FMLA.
36 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 546 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Even if the anecdotal evidence and conclusory statements relied on by the majority
could be properly considered, the mere existence of an architecturally "inacces-
sible" courthouse - i.e., one a disabled person cannot utilize without assistance -
does not state a constitutional violation. A violation of due process occurs only
when a person is actually denied the constitutional right to access a given judicial
proceeding.
Id. (second emphasis added).
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in Brown, the Chief Justice might have required something more than psychological
harm - perhaps a showing that the African American students were not given
books or completely denied access to an educational facility - in other words, a dep-
rivation which actually affected their ability to obtain an education. Justice Thomas,
in his usually brief fashion, would join the Chief Justice's dissent. Justice Scalia,
by contrast, would not only have rejected the majority's holding that "[s]eparate...
[is] inherently unequal,"37 but would likely have emphasized the need for a bright
line test to determine what constituted "equal" educational facilities and the role of
history in so defining the term.38
In Lane, the Court ultimately reached a conclusion that will likely inure to the
benefit of people with disabilities. The holding, however, could and should have
been more powerful. Considering Lane through the lens of Brown suggests that the
methodological path was less than ideal. Brown's lessons, however, extend not only
to the disability context, but likewise to other civil rights movements. The authors in
this symposium address the modem twists on civil rights law in the United States -
discussing the lessons we can learn from Brown and other historical civil rights de-
cisions.
Carlos A. Ball, in The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from
Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath,39 points out similarities in the back-
lash to Brown and that which followed the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
upholding of same-sex marriage in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. °
Despite the assertion of some gay and lesbian rights advocates that the latter has
been harmful to their cause, a contention well-documented by sudden and fierce resis-
tance to same-sex rights, Professor Ball argues that political and legal backlash is
a foreseeable and expected result of controversial civil right decisions.4 The rights
of sexual minorities, he opines, however, are ultimately served by path-breaking
judicial decisions that awaken social consciousness (even in negative form) to the
homosexual community. 2 Nevertheless, he suggests there is a limit to the progress
that can be made in the courtroom and, at some point in time, the emphasis must shift
to the political arena. For gay and lesbian rights, he argues, that time has come.43
3' Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
38 See, e.g., Lane, 541 U.S. at 557-58 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he 'congruence
and proportionality' standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing invitation to judicial
arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking. Worse still, it casts this Court in the role of
Congress's taskmaster.").
39 Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown
v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493 (2006).
40 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
4' Ball, supra note 39, at 1494.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1536-37.
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In Sexuality and Sovereignty: The Global Limits and Possibilities of Lawrence, 44
Sonia K. Katyal considers the import of the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence
v. Texas,45 a decision which some scholars have suggested is reminiscent of Brown,
in a global context. Professor Katyal identifies three dominant foreign perspectives
of homosexuality: governments that view homosexuality as a uniquely Western
experience that should be rejected; international sexual minority rights advocates
embracing a univocal typology of gay, lesbian, and bisexual identity that elides their
community's diversity; and social constructionists who believe that identity is best
expressed within local contexts. 46 To date, many cases in the gay-rights context have
depended upon the second view, which focuses on sexual orientation or gay identity
as the paradigm for asserting rights-based claims. In Lawrence, by contrast, the Court
focused on the individual's right to autonomy, privacy, and liberty in sexual decision-
making, and thus, offered a "vision of sexual self-determination that is deeply bordered
between public and private expressions of sexuality and desire."'47 Professor Katyal
contends that this vision of sexual self-determination in Lawrence, though having its
limits, nevertheless may translate more easily to cultures that reject Western notions
of sexual orientation or identity.4"
Angela Harris connects these two papers in her article, From Stonewall to the
Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality.49 Though applauding Ball and
Katyal's optimistic view of Goodridge and Lawrence, Professor Harris cautions that
like the civil rights activists in Brown, by winning the legal battle, gay rights
proponents may effectively lose the war.5" The victory in Brown, she suggests, may
be merely symbolic.5 Although in theory Brown eradicated segregation, its holding
served only to tame the radical vision of rights activists who ultimately faced a po-
litical economy that fueled racial and class segregation.52 Likewise, she warns, the
right to gay marriage and freedom of sexual activity may signal the end of a progres-
sive revolution aimed at a transformation in social views of sexuality and family
relations.53 Given the law's commitment to structural liberalism, she, like Professor
Ball, explains that the struggle for gay rights cannot end in the courtroom.
5 4
4 Sonia K. Katyal, Sexuality and Sovereignty: The Global Limits and Possibilities of
Lawrence, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1429 (2006).
4' 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4 Katyal, supra note 44, at 1433.
41 Id. at 1436.
48 Id.
49 Angela Harris, Out in the Suburbs: Sexuality, Politics, and Neoliberalism, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 1539 (2006).
'o Id. at 1540-41, 1543, 1568.
"' Id. at 1547.
52 Id. at 1546.
51 Id. at 1543.
Id. at 1582.
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